By EUvsDisinfo
Georgia’s ruling party has adopted increasingly hostile rhetoric against the EU and the West as it seeks to clamp down on the opposition. Pro-Kremlin outlets in the country have readily aligned with government rhetoric ahead of the elections.
In recent years, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party’s pro-EU stance has sharply declined, signalling a growing rift between Georgia’s leadership and the country’s Western allies. Following its refusal to join EU sanctions on Russia after its unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the GD leadership began to subtly distance itself from its previous pro-EU agenda, despite publicly claiming otherwise. Since then, GD’s rhetoric has shifted to more explicit and open accusations against the West – particularly the US and the EU. This article retraces the evolution of this shift and highlights increasing alignment with pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives and information manipulation.
Applying for membership
Paradoxically, GD’s shift away from its pro-EU stance intensified when Georgia applied for EU membership alongside Ukraine and Moldova in March 2022. While the GD leaders felt strongly that Georgia deserved candidate status, the European Commission’s Opinion led instead to Georgia being granted a ‘European perspective’ on 23 June 2022, with twelve priorities to address before advancing on the accession path.
Already looking for a scapegoat, GD pre-emptively cast doubt on the outcome by promoting various false narratives and conspiracy theories. These included allegations that opposition figures and civil society organisations were actively campaigning against Georgia’s EU candidacy, along with statements asserting that Georgia was better prepared to join the EU than Ukraine and Moldova, positioning Georgia as more deserving of candidacy. GD officials also frontally targeted certain European officials and institutions. For instance, the European People’s Party (EPP) was accused of obstructing Georgia’s EU integration. Several members of the European Parliament were singled out for their critical stance, facing accusations of ‘attacking the government elected by the people’ and ‘aggressively interfering’ in Georgia’s internal matters.
In the lead-up to the European Council’s decision to grant Georgia a European perspective, GD leaders sought to downplay the significance of candidate status, framing it as important yet ultimately symbolic. Then-Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili even sought to exert pressure on the EU, vowing to ‘lift the curtain on everything and tell everything to our people’ if the EU decision on Georgia’s candidate status would be ‘unfair’ and ‘offensive to our country and people’.
Following the European Council’s decision, GD officials further escalated their anti-EU rhetoric, fully embracing the narrative – already present earlier – that Georgia’s European integration would come at the cost of imposing sanctions on Russia and entering the war. They argued that Georgia was being ‘punished’ for not complying with Western demands to confront Russia militarily.
Georgian Dream split
Soon after the EU granted Georgia a ‘European perspective’ rather than candidate status, several Georgian Dream members of the Parliament left the party, claiming they wanted to ‘more openly inform the public’ on what was really behind the EU’s decision. These MPs began actively campaigning against the EU and the US, promoting anti-Western narratives that suggested Georgia would not receive candidate status unless it engaged in the war or imposed sanctions on Russia. These MPs formed a public movement, People’s Power, claiming to ‘defend’ the reputation of Western institutions in Georgia by exposing the real power structures controlling them.
In practice, however, they openly criticised the US and EU, targeting their representations in Georgia, along with European and American officials. For example, after the US embassy criticised the Surveillance Law, People’s Power accused the embassy of using its ‘agents’ in the country to incite unrest, deepen polarisation, and push for a change in government that would open a second front against Russia. Although People’s Power was especially vocal against the US, it also frequently targeted EU institutions, particularly in response to EU criticism of the Georgian government’s actions. Essentially, People’s Power served to criticise Georgia’s Western partners while allowing the ruling GD to maintain its seemingly pro-Western and pro-European rhetoric.
The foreign agents law
In 2023, People’s Power initiated a draft law on ‘foreign agents’ targeting civil society organisations (CSOs) in Georgia and resembling similar legislation already in use in Russia. Despite widespread local and international criticism, along with a large wave of public protests, the ruling party promoted the bill, highlighting its supposed benefits.
This legislative push was accompanied by a campaign of falsehoods about civil society and media organisations in Georgia, especially those calling out the government’s shortcomings. Accusations also extended to the West. In response to the criticism of the foreign agents law, a People’s Power representative accused Western allies of ‘secretly occupying Georgia’.
Although in 2023 the Georgian Parliament dropped the foreign agents bill in its second reading after widespread public outcry and mass protests, the verbal attacks on CSOs, government watchdogs, fact-checkers, investigative journalists and other government critics persisted. Irakli Kobakhidze, the GD leader at the time, disparaged the protests against the law, claiming the rallies followed the ‘liberal fascism’ ideology. Later, the People’s Power movement echoed these statements, even labelling [unarchived link] the West as the ‘Global War Party’ and accusing it of financing ‘liberal fascism’ in Georgia through various official US and EU institutions.
Candidate status redux
The GD’s propaganda narrative that Georgia was far ahead of Ukraine and Moldova and deserved EU candidacy more than they did intensified in 2023, as the next decision point on Georgia’s EU candidacy drew near. GD officials now consistently blamed the EU for various injustices, claiming that the membership process was not merit-based and that the EU had double standards. For example, then-Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, stated that the EU would make a mistake by denying Georgia candidate status, while then-GD Chair Kobakhidze claimed that a negative decision would deepen polarisation in the country.
Additional GD narratives pre-emptively blamed the ‘Global War Party’. While the Georgian government asserted that it had been addressing the 12 priorities outlined by the European Commission, the GD continued suggesting that the ‘Global War Party’ might still seek to prevent Georgia from receiving candidate status, thereby attempting to deflect responsibility for any potential negative outcomes for the country.
As GD sought pre-emptive excuses, the authorities escalated their rhetoric, with the State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) issuing a statement blaming a ‘certain group of people, both inside and outside of Georgia’, for allegedly conspiring to incite destabilisation and civil unrest with the ultimate goal of ‘forcibly overthrowing the government’. The SSSG specifically noted that this plot would be activated in conjunction with the decision on Georgia’s EU candidacy and claimed that its execution was being coordinated and financially supported by ‘foreign countries’.
Shortly thereafter, the SSSG released another statement revealing additional details about the purported conspiracy. The SSSG alleged that three Serbian trainers, brought to Georgia as part of a USAID-funded programme, were actively recruiting and training activists to orchestrate the violent overthrow of the government. They emphasized that these trainers were connected to CANVAS (Centre for Applied Non-Violent Actions and Strategies), reiterating previous claims that CANVAS was preparing youth groups for a ‘revolutionary scenario’, allegedly scheduled to unfold between October and December 2023.
These ‘revelations’ from the SSSG prompted reactions from the GD, whose leadership reinforced the assertions. An event organised by (online outlet) Indigo and supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung led members of the ruling party to claim that civil society organisations funded by the West were planning ‘revolutionary processes’ in Georgia, and that these actors had prevented the adoption of the foreign agents law in March 2023 in order to conceal their plans. The West was accused of funding radicalism and a revolutionary agenda.
However, even after the EU granted Georgia candidate status in December 2023, the GD persisted in its anti-Western and anti-EU rhetoric.
Foreign agents 2.0
Despite significant criticism in 2023 over the draft foreign agents bill, and against its own promises not to revive it, the GD reintroduced the law in April 2024, accompanied by a statement fiercely attacking Georgian CSOs, accusing them of seeking regime change and dragging the country into a war with Russia, and demanding greater transparency of their foreign funding. The GD also blamed the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) for allegedly meddling in the 2024 elections.
The bill’s reintroduction sparked heightened local and international criticism, while Kremlin-backed support bolstered the GD’s stance. Anti-Western rhetoric from GD officials grew, with figures such as former Prime Minister of Georgia and multibillionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili accusing a so-called Western ‘Global War Party’ of meddling in Georgia’s affairs and seeking to undermine Georgia’s sovereignty with the help of CSOs. In response to protests against the law, GD staged a pro-government rally where Ivanishvili accused the West of treating Georgia and Ukraine as ‘cannon fodder’ and blamed Western intelligence for interference in Georgian politics.
GD officials also dismissed the European Parliament resolution condemning the law, with Speaker Shalva Papuashvili calling it meaningless and insulting, then echoed by PM Irakli Kobakhidze and other GD leaders. GD Secretary General Kakha Kaladze labelled it ‘shameful waste paper’, while Vice PM Tea Tsulukiani suggested it was intended to punish Georgia for its independence.
After a letter from prominent MEPs urged EU High Representative Josep Borrell to consider suspending Georgia’s EU candidate status because of the violent suppression of protests against the foreign agents law, GD leaders attacked the credibility of the MEPs involved. Speaker Papuashvili claimed there was no risk of suspension, casting doubt on the MEPs’ intentions and calling them supporters of the United National Movement (UNM), while Maka Bochorishvili accused the MEPs of trying to incite protests.
Ruling party representatives and their affiliates also slandered various European officials following their participation in a protest rally against the law in Tbilisi. They denounced their attendance at the protest as unacceptable interference supporting the opposition. Some described the presence of EU diplomats and other politicians at the protest as yet more proof of outside involvement in a ‘revolution’, and gross interference in the internal affairs of the country, serving the process of ‘Maidanization’ and aiming to strengthen ‘domestic radical opposition’. Other narratives framed the European officials as agents of the ‘Global War Party’.
A key propaganda narrative used by the ruling party and its allies around the adoption of the controversial foreign agents law accused the EU and other Western countries of double standards since they allegedly had similar laws, or were in the process of adopting them. GD officials also criticised the EU’s decision to put on hold part of the military aid to Georgia, casting it as both harmful to Western interests and a political move aimed at undermining the Georgian government.
The 2024 elections
Despite claims from GD officials that the government has never spread disinformation against the EU or the US nor blamed them for trying to open a second front, a general election scheduled for 26 October 2024 fuelled a further increase of persistent anti-Western rhetoric from the GD.
GD founder Bidzina Ivanishvili launched the campaign with renewed warnings and scaremongering about the so-called ‘Global War Party’, a force supposedly working to drag Georgia into a war with Russia. He identified opposition groups, particularly the UNM, and CSOs as agents of this alleged force, claiming that they acted under the influence of foreign interests determined to create unrest and bring the UNM back to power. Ivanishvili characterised the upcoming elections as a ‘referendum’ on peace versus war, positioning Georgian Dream as the only true guarantor of peace, while branding opposition parties as facilitators of external agendas. In his speeches, he pledged that GD would defeat these ‘war’ forces, which, he alleged, have been aiming to provoke conflict in Georgia for years. Ivanishvili emphasised that the ‘Global War Party’ wielded significant influence over the American and European bureaucracies and was working against Georgia’s national interests under the guise of the EU and US.
Despite the hostile rhetoric, Ivanishvili was in fact trying to tread a fine line: he suggested that the GD was determined to protect the reputation of Georgia’s Western allies while parts of the US and the EU administrations were seeking regime change in the country. Rather than directly blaming the EU and the US, he placed the responsibility on the so-called ‘Global War Party’ controlling the administrations.
Anti-Western messaging has become a core tactic for GD and its affiliates from People’s Power, with leaders repeatedly accusing Western allies of meddling in Georgia’s internal affairs. Party figures suggested that foreign actors intended to influence the electoral process, fund the opposition campaign through illicit means, plan to delegitimise the election results and attempt to orchestrate a coup to install a compliant government that would support military confrontation with Russia. In a stark appeal to voters, GD framed the election as a choice between peace and war, “liberal fascism” and traditional values, national independence and foreign control and between Georgia’s dark past and a bright European future. The party implied that a GD loss would hand Georgia over to foreign powers, resulting in war.
Since the start of the election campaign, GD officials have also ramped up efforts to discredit international organisations and election observers, accusing them of backing the opposition and interfering in the election. Pro-Kremlin outlets exploit GD’s shifting rhetoric.
Georgian Dream’s gradual departure from its pro-EU stance and its shift in tone toward the EU provided a solid foundation for pro-Kremlin voices in Georgia to promote their agenda. Pro-Kremlin outlets and actors have been particularly active in stirring anti-EU sentiment and propagating anti-EU messages around major events such as EU decisions concerning Georgia’s EU integration process.
A delayed candidate status
Since Georgia’s EU membership application, pro-Kremlin sources have consistently sought to undermine the country’s European integration, casting doubt on Georgia’s membership prospects, disparaging candidate status, and targeting EU officials and MEPs critical of GD’s actions.
One of the most common pro-Kremlin themes, especially before Georgia was granted candidate status, sought to downplay its importance, claiming it was merely symbolic and offered no substantial benefits for Georgia. Some narratives argued that candidacy would impose new burdens and commitments on Georgia without reciprocal benefits from the EU.
In addition, pro-Kremlin sources also promoted fears that the EU would never accept Georgia as a member state. Various openly pro-Kremlin actors also pushed the notion that EU membership would require Georgia to legalise ‘gay marriage’, and more broadly that membership would mean a rejection of Georgian identity, traditional values, and Orthodoxy, framing the pursuit of EU integration as an act of betrayal of ‘true Georgianness’.
Following the EU’s decision in June 2022 to grant Georgia a European perspective (and not EU candidacy), some pro-Kremlin sources accused the opposition of working against Georgia’s candidate status for their own interests, portraying this as a reason for the EU’s decision. They even speculated that the opposition was aiming to incite a Maidan-like movement in the country. The EU’s decision sparked a fresh wave of anti-EU rhetoric from pro-Kremlin sources, echoing key propaganda claims previously voiced by the ruling GD party.
As early as 2022, pro-Kremlin sources vigorously promoted the idea that various foreign and internal forces were pressuring Georgia to open a ‘second front’ against Russia. These narratives claimed that the West viewed Georgia as a strategic tool to confront Russia and to serve US and European interests. Allegedly, the US seeks to keep a perpetual hotspot on Russia’s southern border. Similar claims tied to Georgia’s pending EU candidate status suggested that while the West might not explicitly call for war, it implied that opening a second front could be necessary to secure EU candidacy. Other narratives asserted that Western financial support primarily funded protests and unrest in Georgia, ultimately pushing the country toward conflict and potentially leading it to a fate similar to Ukraine’s.
The foreign agents law
Pro-Kremlin sources strongly backed GD public attacks against CSOs in Georgia following the contentious foreign agents law. They aimed to discredit CSOs, depicting them as tools of Western influence. Some argued that CSOs frequently served foreign intelligence agencies, gathering information and working against Georgia’s interests, labelling them as foreign agents who receive financial support in exchange for undermining their own country.
Additionally, others asserted that many CSOs pursued specific party agendas, in particular those of the United National Movement (UNM). Notably, certain pro-Kremlin actors advocated for an even stricter version of the foreign agents law, calling for criminal penalties and an outright ban on foreign funding for CSOs and media outlets.
Following a visit to Georgia by High Representative Josep Borrell in September 2023, these sources intensified claims that the US and the EU were actively preparing unrest in Georgia, alleging that the denial of candidate status would be used to incite destabilisation, laying the groundwork for a coup – a ‘colour revolution’ – orchestrated by Western forces. They argued that Borrell’s visit was intended to encourage and rally opposition forces to mobilise for protests later that year.
Candidate status
After Georgia was granted candidate status in December 2023, pro-Kremlin sources in 2024 persisted in their efforts to discredit the EU, framing the candidate status as symbolic only and stirring scepticism about the Union. They revived narratives suggesting that the only tangible result of EU candidacy was increased funding to CSOs that pressured the government, without delivering real benefits to Georgians. They also argued that EU recommendations aimed to bring Georgia under Western control, casting the EU as a ‘fascist’ force opposing God and the Orthodox Church.
Some pro-Kremlin narratives were very critical of GD and the government. Ultra-conservative, far right Alt-Info TV even interpreted Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s trip to Brussels as a sign of a ‘deal’ with the EU, claiming the GD government agreed to soften its anti-EU rhetoric and consider a coalition government aligned with Western interests. In this supposed arrangement, the EU would refrain from targeting Bidzina Ivanishvili, focusing instead on conservative groups in Georgia.
However, GD’s subsequent actions soon prompted a realignment of pro-Kremlin narratives with government rhetoric. First, GD announced a draft constitutional law against ‘LGBTI propaganda’ and then reintroduced the controversial foreign agents bill, albeit under a new name. Pro-Kremlin sources not only praised these moves, but also pledged to defend the ‘anti-LGBTI propaganda’ law, even by force. They also defended the need for ‘transparency’ in foreign funding and promoted the foreign agents law as a measure to enhance national sovereignty. They echoed government rhetoric that the law was essential for transparency and rebuked civil society organisations as foreign agents . These narratives also claimed that similar laws existed in Western countries, countering criticism that labelled the bill as ‘Russian-style’. This messaging aligned closely with pro-government rhetoric in Georgia.
The 2024 elections
Ahead of the parliamentary elections of 26 October, pro-Kremlin sources began echoing the ruling party’s rhetoric. They claimed that the West, including the EU, would attempt to delegitimise the elections, framing them as rigged in order to incite revolutionary scenarios and topple the current government. These narratives suggested that Georgia was on the brink of a ‘colour revolution’ similar to Ukraine’s Maidan, asserting that Western policy now sought to destabilise the entire post-Soviet region, including the South Caucasus, by turning it into an anti-Russian front.
According to this narrative, the West aims to replace the Georgian Dream party with a pro-Western elite ready for conflict with Russia, actively supporting anti-government protests and movements through local CSOs and allied groups. Pro-Kremlin sources further claimed that only Russia and Vladimir Putin could prevent this planned coup in Georgia.
These outlets also continued to question Georgia’s EU membership prospects, urging a re-evaluation of the country’s aspirations. They argued that the EU was controlled by the ‘Global War Party’ and the ‘Deep State’, both hostile to Georgia’s national interests, thus making EU membership incompatible with the country’s interests. As part of this narrative, they criticised the constitutional article affirming Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, advocating for its removal.
In sum, the information environment in Georgia remains hotly contested, with pro-Kremlin and Georgian Dream discourse converging in their use of increasingly anti-EU / anti-Western disinformation narratives. Don’t be deceived.
By EUvsDisinfo
