By Olena Snigyr, Ph.D, for EUvsDisinfo
In its confrontation with the West, Russia seeks allies among the countries of the Global South, particularly in Africa. Recently, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has become involved in this effort. On 29 December 2021, the ROC decided to establish its own exarchate in Africa, encompassing all African countries. Since then, the ROC has rapidly expanded its presence on the African continent. Its activity is already noticeable in almost 30 African countries and its declared ambitions are to expand its influence throughout the whole continent.
The Russian Orthodox Church primarily serves as an instrument of the Russian authoritarian regime, and its actions should be viewed within the context of Russian policy and the Kremlin’s strategic objectives. In Africa, the ROC pursues several goals:
- it increases the loyalty of the local population to Russia, popularises the Russian language, and spreads pro-Russian propaganda;
- it strengthens the positions of the Russian Orthodox Church in its struggle for a dominant role in world Orthodoxy;
- it creates additional platforms and communication channels to promote the economic interests of Russian state corporations and powerful officials, while also covering the activities of Russian mercenaries, special services, and intelligence agents.
As a force for Russian soft power, the ROC spreads not just Orthodoxy, but specifically Russian Orthodoxy. Its mission aligns the church with the ideology and strategic narratives of the Russian state that are hostile to Western liberal democracies.
Activity on the ground
Representatives of the ROC state that their expansion into Africa – the canonical territory of the Patriarchate of Alexandria – is a response to Patriarch Theodore II’s recognition of the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). They also claim that the formation of the African Exarchate was prompted by requests from African priests dissatisfied with the pastoral care provided by the Patriarchate of Alexandria. This is not the first instance of the ROC ‘seizing territories’. In 2021, it created a diocese in Armenia, despite previously recognising the Armenian Church’s authority and refraining from establishing its own structures there.
The ROC is quite optimistic about expanding its presence on the African continent, considering it an undeveloped territory receptive to Russian influence. Among favourable factors, Russian priests mention the positive historical memory of the USSR’s role in the process of Africa’s decolonisation, the attachment of African societies to traditional values (patriarchal traditions), their inclination toward a religious and mythological worldview, and widespread poverty and poor living conditions (here and here). In these circumstances, the ROC’s tactics are effective. They include financial incentives for African priests willing to join the Russian church, promises of a better life through Russian educational and humanitarian projects, and the instrumentalization of historical memory.
Strategy in Africa
The initial strategy of the ROC in Africa prioritised rapid expansion and increasing the number of parishioners, often at the expense of clergy quality. In 2022-23, the ROC was criticised (here and here) for using financial incentives as a compelling argument for priests and communities to join its flock. However, today the ROC attaches great importance to the quality of its agents of influence and is expanding educational programmes for students from Africa. The ROC openly declares the goal of its educational activity: to transform African students into advocates who will not only preach Orthodoxy but also defend Russia’s interests.
Caring about its public image, the Russian Orthodox Church decorates its projects in Africa with low-budget humanitarian programmes involving figures like Maria Lvova-Belova, the Commissioner for Children’s Rights under the President of the Russian Federation. These activities include ‘humanitarian’ and ‘educational’ initiatives and the construction of large temple complexes. The first such complex, which will also feature a school and a hospital, is planned for Kampala, Uganda, opposite the presidential palace.
Behind this façade, the ROC closely coordinates with Russian state authorities including law enforcement agencies, special services, Russian mercenaries, and the Ministries of Defence and of Foreign Affairs. For instance, the future temple complex in Kampala is expected to be integrated with the Russian Centre of Science and Culture. Similar direct interactions occur elsewhere. For example, Russian diplomats manage the Russian Spiritual and Cultural Orthodox Centre in Paris.
Mission
The religious feeling that the Russian church spreads among its African flock reinforces Russian propaganda and ideological narratives. Thus, alongside the Kremlin’s narrative of the Russian mission to save humanity from the malign influence of liberal values, the ROC pushes the narrative of the global mission of the Apostolic Canonical Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to preserve the ‘true faith’. This narrative puts the ROC in opposition not only to Western Rite churches, which according to representatives of the ROC have been spoiled by modernisation, but also with other Orthodox churches that supported granting autocephaly to the OCU.
Central to this narrative is the opposition between the ROC and the Patriarchate of Alexandria. The ROC has criticised (here, here, here and here) Greek priests for allegedly providing poor spiritual education and pastoral care in African countries, accusing them of promoting Hellenism, Grecophilism, neo-colonialism, and racism. These claims contrast sharply with statements made by ROC representatives a few years ago. For instance, in 2016, Georgy Maksimov acknowledged the success of Greek missionaries in Africa, noting, ‘In “black” Africa there are already many native converts, estimated between five to seven million African Orthodox. They turn to faith and become churched thanks to the work of Greek missionaries… But we, the largest Orthodox Church, do not take any part in the mission of Orthodoxy in Africa… The Greeks, who are ten times fewer than us, bear the missionary burden.’
This shift underscores the ROC’s methods of leveraging historical narratives and contemporary grievances to position itself as the true guardian of Orthodoxy while expanding its influence under the guise of religious and humanitarian efforts. The ROC’s alignment with Russian state objectives highlights a coordinated effort to extend Russia’s ideological and geopolitical reach in Africa.
The Russian Orthodox Church designs its narratives and propaganda according to the general framework of Russian strategic narratives. The pillars of this narrative-making are weaponised historical memory and a supposed conflict of values.
Weaponizing historical memory
Leveraging historical memories of the USSR’s role in decolonisation, the ROC asserts that Russia was never a colonial power and did not participate in colonising Africa. The ROC enriches its ‘soul-saving mission’ narrative with themes of liberating Africa from the influence of other churches that ‘tainted themselves by participating in the slave trade, supporting colonisers as well as inter-tribal conflicts’, encouraged ‘genocide in Rwanda’, and in recent years ‘disappointed Africans by rejecting biblical moral teachings in favour of homosexuality, transgenderism, feminism, etc’.
The Russian narrative of its decolonial legacy in Africa is strongly connected to the narrative of the Russian people’s exclusive role as the liberators of Europe from Nazism in World War II.
At the same time, the current Russian war with Ukraine and Russia’s confrontation with the West are portrayed as an unfinished process of decolonisation or de-Westernisation. The church presents Russia as a non-colonial power, a fighter against Western neocolonialism, and a moral defender against liberal values that are portrayed as contrary to biblical teachings.
Traditional values
The Russian leadership perceives Africa as an important ally in promoting ‘traditional values’ within the larger struggle between two value systems. The ‘conflict of values’ is a Russian strategic narrative used to frame its confrontation with the West and its war with Ukraine as existential. Representatives of the ROC believe that African societies favour so-called traditional values that are patriarchal and patrimonial in nature, contributing to the favourable attitude of African peoples toward Russia. In their rhetoric aimed at African audiences, the Russians emphasise ‘family values,’ contrasting them with Western concepts of gender equality and the right to self-expression.
The Russian agenda of protecting traditional values is part of a broader goal to deprive liberal values such as human rights of their universal status and dismantle the world order built on Western principles. For instance, Patriarch Kirill of the ROC proposed the development and international adoption of a Convention on the Rights and Protection of the Family, intending to involve African countries in its discussion and promotion. This move exemplifies how Russia seeks to instrumentalise the idea of protecting traditional values in opposition to human rights.
It is crucial to understand that the narrative of protecting traditional values is a core component of Russian politics and its strategic narrative of defending humanity from liberal values. The seemingly attractive Christian rhetoric of the ROC about ‘protecting traditions, traditional values, the family’ and similar themes serves to mask the underlying Russian propaganda of authoritarianism.
Church as a foreign policy tool
The Russian Orthodox Church significantly influences Russian foreign policy both morally and institutionally. It serves as a tool of Russian soft power and acts as a political entity. Key elements of Russian ideology, such as the concepts of the ‘Russian world,’ Russian messianism, and traditional values, are shaped within the Church. Important considerations include the indoctrination of the Russian military by ROC teachings and the alignment of the Church with the Russian Army and far-right traditionalists. Essentially, the ROC has become a conduit for promoting the ideas of promoters of Russian fascism like Aleksandr Dugin and Konstantin Malofeev.
The ROC in Africa is a small but effective instrument of Russian policy. The battle for Africa is largely ideological and value-driven. The goal of the ROC’s ‘missionary activity’ is to create an emotional attachment to Russia in African societies through allegedly shared values. Although it is difficult to accurately predict the outcome of the Russian Orthodox Church’s activities, the combination of the soft power of Russian propaganda and cultural diplomacy with religion could help Russia achieve the desired result better than the work of Russian cultural centres and controlled media.
By Olena Snigyr, Ph.D, for EUvsDisinfo
