The country’s extreme right is prospering ahead of re-run presidential elections despite extensive evidence of continuing Russian subversion.
By Alison Mutler, for CEPA
Calin Georgescu wasn’t a household name when he unexpectedly won the first round of Romania’s presidential elections in November. But at the peak of his campaign, he was massively famous on social media, and trending in the top nine globally on TikTok.
This huge, worldwide presence, which led to the “TikTok Messiah” moniker, goes some way to explaining how Russian interference helped him go from single digits in the polls to winning 23% of the vote. Georgescu has called Ukraine an “invented state,” and suggested that Romania should take back ethnic Romanian areas. The former presidential candidate’s rhetoric echoes Russia’s revisionist logic for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Declassified intelligence data show his campaign was coordinated through Telegram and other social media accounts with 5,000 agents spread across the globe paying out at least $850,000. The network was similar to a social media campaign used before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Romania’s domestic intelligence agency, the SRI, said.
The campaign has been underway for years, with the first accounts established as early as 2016. Tens of thousands more accounts were ultimately used to spread disinformation, which only went into overdrive two-to-three weeks before the elections. There were three steps: first the campaign’s controllers built the infrastructure, second they prepared the targets (identifying micro-segments and setting up non-political pages to lure readers.) Finally, they created the “ideal” president, with hundreds of professional videos for each segment with appropriate messaging.
The interference was managed through 66,000 Romanian accounts. These were closed down by TikTok after the election at which point 7 million false “likes” also vanished. As did 10 million fake followers/bots. Hundreds of influencers were paid to amplify the message.
Some of the accounts were traced back to a London address (the UK’s Companies House is notoriously lax in allowing firms to set up, and is used by criminals and foreign spies). The address, at 5 Percy Street, W1, also houses nearly 180 other companies, some of which are linked to Russian military intelligence, the GRU. Digital influence researchers at Berlin-based Intelligence Online revealed that it is also home to a network of Romanian influencers close to the Russian embassy in Bucharest. A company named Bunelu Ltd, based at 5 Percy Street, was found to be connected to Georgescu.
“To make 100 million posts in a day costs $3m dollars. We estimate (Georgescu’s) campaign cost at least €50m [$54m] . . . We are talking about an enormous IT infrastructure, a very high capacity to create content,” said Dan Sucu, chairman of the Association of Large Retail Networks in Romania.
On March 21, police arrested Bogdan Peșchir, a 36-year-old crypto-currency businessman considered the main financer of Georegescu’s TikTok campaign. He is accused of 265 counts of voter corruption. Prosecutors said he offered $879,000 in “gifts” via the TikTok app during live broadcasts and $80,000 on Revolut to induce 265 people to vote for Georgescu.
Romania’s top court has removed Georgescu from the new presidential election slated for May. But given the apparent ease and success of the first campaign, fears of continuing Russian operations loom.
There are risks here for the far-right. Open support for the Kremlin is the kiss of death for Romanian politicians. While record numbers embraced the far-right in December parliamentary elections, voters remain wary of Moscow and want the country to stay within the Western orbit.
At first, when Romania’s constitutional court annulled elections, many Romanians were dismayed and simply did not believe the allegations, blaming the cancellation on the political elite trying to protect itself. Attitudes have shifted somewhat since then, as evidence of Russian involvement has grown.
But there remains widespread support for so-called anti-system candidates who have enthralled those voters open to victimhood narratives and feeling disillusionment with the mainstream parties which have governed Romania since communism ended.
George Simion, a former football hooligan and leader of Romania’s biggest far-right party, AUR, stepped up after Georgescu was banned and now heads the opinion polls. The 38-year-old is styling himself as a less exotic and more pro-Western version of Georgescu, despite being banned from Ukraine and Moldova by their pro-Western governments, and recent meetings with Austria’s far-right politicians, including president of the Austrian Parliament, Walter Rosenkranz. Simion is being investigated after calling for election officials to be “skinned alive” for barring Georgescu from the race.
Polls show the 38-year-old winning the first round, but not necessarily the runoff. He’s one of 11 candidates standing for the May 4 and May 18 re-run.
The pro-Western vote is split between Bucharest mayor Nicusor Dan, running on an independent centrist ticket, and Crin Antonescu, the candidate for the three-party ruling coalition. Centrist small town mayor, Elena Lasconi who made it to the runoff of last year’s presidential election and a strong critic of the election cancelation, is also standing again.
Former Prime Minister Victor Ponta is the bridge between the nationalists and pro-European camp. He ran for president in 2014, losing to Klaus Iohannis who was forced to step down as president on February 12 after two terms. Ponta supported Georgescu in the first round and is seen as a dark horse, appealing to Georgescu nationalists as well as those who don’t want to jeopardize Romania’s NATO and EU memberships but aren’t wholeheartedly pro-Western.
Georgecu’s brief but dramatic tenure as Romania’s most notorious and controversial politician has cast a long shadow over the May election. He bowed out after his ban, cryptically saying “my mission is done” and has refused to endorse a successor.
In another twist, Romania detained six people on March 6 on charges of trying to overthrow the state with Russia’s help. A 101-year-old former army major general said his home had been raided as part of the investigation.
The same day, authorities expelled the Russian military attaché and his deputy for what they said were acts contravening diplomatic rules.
Police said investigations supported by Romanian intelligence services revealed that the group allegedly sought “the removal of the current constitutional order, the dissolution of political parties,” and the installation of a new government formed by its members.
Meanwhile, Georgescu has been charged. Some of the six counts relate to his support for sympathizers of the Iron Guard, a pre-World War II fascist and antisemitic movement and political party, which is illegal under Romanian law. Emerging after questioning, the politician was filmed giving a fascist-style salute.
Evidence implicating Russian military intelligence includes Georgescu’s connection with mercenary Horatiu Potra, who is linked to figures associated with Russian influence.
Russia’s campaign of destabilization in Romania may have suffered a setback with Georgescu out of the race, but it hasn’t given up on its wider strategy to weaken Western alliances to boost its own strategic freedom in the Black Sea region. So far, the Kremlin has banked benefits with virtually no costs.
By Alison Mutler, for CEPA
Alison Mutler is a British journalist who has been working in Romania for almost 35 years. She was the Associated Press bureau chief for 25 years and was part of a team that covered the Romanian revolution for the British TV channel ITN. For the past five years, she has worked for the Romanian-English website Universul.net and has been its director for the past three years.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
