By Alison Mutler, for CEPA
The country has been plunged into political instability by a Russian campaign that no one saw coming.
Romania avoided a bullet, but the gunman is still at large.
That’s how some analysts describe Romania’s political situation after, in less than a month, it went from a reliable and committed NATO and European Union (EU) member to a southeast European country mired in political turmoil and uncertainty. It’s a grim picture, and there’s no immediate fix in sight.
First, a radical pro-Russian outsider Călin Georgescu improbably won the first round of presidential elections on November 24, sending shockwaves through the political establishment. Then a top court canceled the vote after evidence emerged that Russian interference had aided his campaign.
In between, three nationalist parties with anti-Western views made historic gains in December 1 parliamentary elections leaving mainstream parties struggling to form a cohesive majority. The turmoil deepened on December 19, as Romania’s biggest party, the Social Democratic Party, pulled out of fraught talks for a pro-European governing coalition, leaving the remaining parties vulnerable and lacking a majority.
The formation of a new government was further complicated after parliament’s biggest nationalist party, AUR, offered to govern alongside pro-European groups as long as it gets the post of prime minister.
President Klaus Iohannis on Thursday appealed to parties to recognize the precarious situation. “Romania is in a very complicated situation with a war at its border. We have hybrid attacks on Romania which led to the annulment of presidential elections; an unprecedented situation. We have a very complicated situation in the European Union where states which were the engines of the Union are facing domestic problems. The last thing Romania needs is an extended governmental and parliamentary crisis.”
Romania’s next government will inherit a government deficit forecast to reach 8% of GDP in 2024 (according to the European Commission.) The deficit reflects very fast growth in government spending, mostly due to large increases in public sector wages, expenditure in goods and services and social transfers, including pensions.
It also reflects slightly slower revenue growth due to weaker-than-predicted economic activity.
On December 17, Fitch Ratings signaled it may cut Romania’s credit grade, citing high political uncertainty. It lowered the outlook on Romania’s BBB- rating, the lowest investment level, to negative from stable, sending a warning to pro-European parties as they struggle to form a coalition after parliamentary elections. Worsening credit ratings mean higher costs for government borrowing.
Political turmoil continues after the canceled election, with some saying the court saved democracy and others who think it has been subverted by a political mainstream parties unwilling to surrender power to independents and radicals. There is no timetable for a new government to be in place, or for presidential elections.
Iohannis, 65, has said he will stay on until a new president is elected, as per the constitution. But there have been calls for the unpopular head of state to step down in an increasingly febrile atmosphere.
In an effort to communicate why the election was canceled, Iohannis finally revealed two weeks later that the “state actor” that had been accused of meddling in the election to favor Georgescu, a pro-Russian soil scientist and conspiracist, was in fact Russia. The Romanian leader, who is known for being cautious, said diplomatic norms and lack of absolute proof in hybrid attacks made it difficult to directly point the finger at the Kremlin which acted in a “subtle and complex” way.
That didn’t stop US Secretary of State Antony Blinken who accused Russia of interfering with the Romanian elections on December 5, a day after Romania declassified intelligence reports that showed a meddling by a foreign state. Moscow has denied interference, as it did in neighboring Moldova, where the government also produced evidence of a substantial campaign against pro-Western candidates and parties. Ministers and officials said Russia spent tens of millions of dollars on a range of activities including bribes to individual voters.
Russia has been waging a covert disinformation war in Romania and Bulgaria for years. BG Elves, a group focused on combating disinformation and hybrid threats, revealed in December, that the Kremlin had spent €69m ($72m) since 2010 on a large-scale propaganda and disinformation campaign to spread Russian influence and promote far-right narratives in the two countries.
Moscow’s narratives are subtle, avoiding direct mention of the Kremlin. Instead, its disinformation in Romania focuses on discontent with mainstream political parties — an opinion poll showed dismal levels of public faith in the honesty of government spending for example. It also taps encourages the idea that the EU and NATO somehow treat Romanians as second-class citizens, and force Western cultural norms onto socially conservative societies. It operates on social media like TikTok, which are popular in impoverished rural areas and through some Romanian Orthodox Church priests who sympathize with the Russian Orthodox Church.
So covert was the ongoing disinformation campaign, that the political establishment was blindsided. Everything was turned on its head when outsider Georgescu easily won the first round and was the frontrunner for the runoff against centrist mayor Elena Lasconi.
Days later, declassified Romanian intelligence files revealed evidence of voter manipulation through social media platforms, illegal campaign financing on TikTok, and cyber-attacks orchestrated by external forces.
One document indicated that 25,000 pro-Georgescu TikTok accounts became highly active two weeks before the first-round vote. Nearly 800 of these had been created in 2016 and remained largely dormant until the election.
The investigation also revealed that Romanian influencers had been paid to promote Georgescu. This was done both explicitly and subtly, through seemingly neutral hashtags associated with the independent candidate. One example is the hashtag #echilibruşiverticalitate, meaning “balance and verticality.”
TikTok also claimed that, since September, it had removed nearly 45 million fake likes, over 27 million fake follow requests, and prevented the creation of more than 400,000 spam accounts in Romania.
Documents reveal that Romania was the target of over 85,000 cyber-attacks before and during election day. These disrupted the IT and communication infrastructure supporting the electoral process.
The Constitutional Court canceled the election after Romanian authorities received backup from its strategic partners about the interference, Iohannis said on December 18.
Some attention has focused on the French-Romanian mercenary Horatiu Potra, one of the leading figures of the private armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, and who is a Georgescu supporter. Romanian police arrested the 54-year-old former member of the French Foreign Legion on December 7. He was found in possession of knives and other edged weapons, and around €30,000 in cash in various currencies.
Prosecutors suspect he planned, along with other mercenaries active in Africa, to incite violence during demonstrations planned for that day (December 7) to protest against the cancellation of the presidential runoff.
A former environment ministry official, Georgescu has copied Vladimir Putin, who he admires and calls a patriot. He rides a horse, bathes in icy lakes and practices black belt judo. He believes nanobots are secretly inserted in cans of Pepsi; that Covid does not exist; and the moon landings were faked. He would cut aid for Ukraine and has threatened judges with “hard years in prison” for annulling the presidential vote.
Georgescu supporters have are promising to protest on December 22, the day after Iohannis’ mandate officially expires.
It is unclear if he will compete in the re-run of the Romanian presidential elections or whether Romanian authorities will ban him over the election interference.
The future Romanian government is due to establish a timeline for a new presidential vote, which is expected to take place in the spring. The process will restart, requiring candidates to gather endorsements to run, which will take time.
But the abandoned election underscores the vulnerability of a previously solid partner. It has exposed the impact that online misinformation campaigns can have on public opinion under the radar, as well as the threat posed by the interference of foreign states to democratic elections. It also underscores the need for a stronger regulatory framework and greater oversight and transparency from major social media platforms.
Lastly, it highlights a growing disillusion with mainstream parties and politicians. Even if Georgescu doesn’t run again, that disillusion remains.
By Alison Mutler, for CEPA
Alison Mutler is a British journalist who has been working in Romania for almost 35 years. She was the Associated Press bureau chief for 25 years and was part of a team that covered the Romanian revolution for the British TV channel ITN. For the past five years, she has worked for the Romanian-English website Universul.net and has been its director for the past three years.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
