Introduction
The mainstay of the regime of hard authoritarianism in the Russian Federation called “Putinism” is state ideology, and its foundation is the cult of the past and heroes. Putin uses history to consolidate Russian society as a collectivist-authoritarian community, to legitimize the dictatorship, and to revise borders with neighbors. Russia’s historical policy is a centralized narrative policy based on state propaganda with recourse to historical myths characterized by chauvinism (русизм), clericalism (political orthodoxy) and historical determinism (imperialism). This is a departure from the interpretive model of doing history in favor of mythicizing it. The “Historia.FR” portal affiliated with the Russian Historical Association reports that “science should not fight myths, especially those of important historical significance.” In Russian historiography, myth clearly dominates the scientific approach. “History and tradition become the subject of faith, contemplation and transcendence, and consequently the subject of mythology” (M. Smolen). Leaving aside revisionism as a research trend in the historical sciences, contemporary Russian historical revisionism consists in the Kremlin’s defense of the so-called “historical truth” (a constitutional provision), in other words, not so much the Russian historical narrative, but the constructed matrix of historical myths, to which the sacred significance of the guardian of the empire-state has been ascribed. As part of such a policy, the government is practicing historical populism within Russia itself and in international relations using, among other things, traditional and modern mass communication tools.
A survey of Russian public opinion conducted by the Romir company showed that in 2021 the factors consolidating Russians as a nation were a common history (26%), a common culture (20%), a common origin (18%), a common language (13%), a common faith (10%) and a common interest in the nation/state (9%). It is interesting to note that a previous survey conducted in 2004 showed the primacy of language (23%), followed at that time by culture and shared national history (19% each). Appreciating the role and importance of history in the internal and international politics of the Russian Federation, especially its instrumentalization, Putin announced in 2023 that “history is used as a weapon in the ideological struggle, so we need an effective tool for defense, which we will use not only to repel attacks, but also for prevention.”
Crime without punishment
The lack of Nuremberg for Soviet criminals has depraved the system of power in Russia (E. Habowski), constituting the rise of Putin’s dictatorship. The state’s monopoly on historical memory during his rule was based, among other things, on freezing the national memory of Russians with regard to the crimes of communism, including the Stalinist regime. Similar measures were taken against the countries and peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. The National Center for Historical Memory under the President of the Russian Federation, established by Putin in 2023 as part of the “Key Elements of Historical Memory” project, shaped the narrative of Russia/USSR as the liberator of the region’s peoples from Nazism. A series of seminars was organized on the liberation of Ukraine, Moldova, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic States. Polish affairs were covered as “The Warsaw Uprising in 1944 and the beginning of Poland’s liberation. A True Story.” In taking up the fight against “historical revisionism” in the West, the Kremlin is practicing historical populism using propaganda and elements of cognitive warfare. In domestic politics, it has set its sights on diluting responsibility for the crimes of the communist regime and persecuting civil society institutions that research and work to memorialize victims of political repression.
In 2021, Russia banned equating Nazism and communism, including comparing the actions of the state leadership and military commanders of the USSR and the Third Reich. In addition, it is forbidden to undermine “the decisive role of the Soviet people in defeating Nazi Germany and the humanitarian mission of the USSR during the liberation of the countries of Europe.” The amendment in 2024 of the Concept for the Commemoration of Victims of Political Repression resulted in the removal of the wording about their mass character and the need to create a network of institutions commemorating the repression. On the other hand, a provision on “Ukrainian nationalism and the Baltic peoples” was introduced into the document.
The consequence of such a policy was the closure of the GULAG History Museum in 2024, and a few years earlier there was the banning of “Memorial” under the pretext of violating the Law on inoagents (foreign agents). The “Perm 36” museum was reformatted into the GULAG Workers Museum. De facto, from 2020, the “Restoration of Names” action, which activists organized every year next to the “Solovetsky Stone”, was suspended. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the “Last Address” plaques commemorating the repressed began to disappear en masse. Historian Irina Shcherbakova of Memorial says bluntly “the Russian authorities are freezing the memory of Stalinist repression and revising Soviet history, betting on a strong state dominating the individual.” The above domination is also taking place in issues of memory culture, where we are dealing with the instrumentalization of history.
The actions of the authorities lead to the restoration of Stalin’s “good name.” This is shown by surveys of Russian public opinion conducted by the Levada Center. In 2001-2010, a positive attitude towards Stalin was declared by 30-35% of respondents, in 2014-2019 already 40-50%, and in 2019-2023 this indicator increased to the level of 63% of respondents. The turn towards dictatorship in Russia during Putin’s rule resulted in a demand for historical models of “positive” heroes, building a “great and powerful” Russia. Stalin’s repression in the framework of historical policy, the authorities presented as a “historical necessity, allowing the country to maintain order,” and Stalin himself as a controversial figure, but a great leader and creator of Russia’s/the USSR’s superpower power.
Nationalization of history
The introduction of the only history textbook in elementary and secondary schools and the compulsory subject “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood” in higher education can be considered an expression of the nationalization of history in the Russian Federation and national memory. The above measures resemble in form the situation from the Soviet era and the mandatory teaching of the “Short Course in History of the CPSU(b).” In early 2013. Putin called for the development of a single textbook, presenting a coherent version of history, devoid of contradictions and different interpretive versions. The unification (nationalization) of history was handled by academics from the Russian Scientific Society, the Russian Military-Historical Society and the Russian Academy of Sciences and MGIMO. The work was finalized in late 2023/2024, when a textbook for grades 10-11 was first presented, followed by a textbook for grades 5-9. Putin did not like the interpretive model of teaching history, when there were about 50 different types of history textbooks on the publishing market. First, the so-called curricular lines (up to 3 textbooks) were introduced, followed by the only textbook, which will take effect from the 2025/2026 school year.
In the only history textbook, information on political repression was kept to a minimum, while extensive sections on the so-called special military operation were introduced. The narrative includes propaganda content about how “at the beginning of the 21st century. Russia sought good-neighborly relations with the US and Europe, but the West was not interested in such a model of relations. The West decided to destabilize the situation along Russia’s borders, and Ukraine was being prepared by NATO and the US for the role of the main anti-Russian force. Beginning in 1990, Ukrainians were raised with neo-Nazi ideas and hostility toward Russia. The authors go on to write about how Ukraine is an extreme nationalist state where there is no freedom, opposition is banned, and anything Russian has been declared hostile. Soviet and Russian monuments are destroyed, and the Ukrainian national movement originated as the idea of an “anti-Moscow Rus’” in Austria in the 19th century. In this way, the thesis of foreign agents who invented a “separate Ukrainian nation” to the detriment of Russia is imposed on students. The textbook’s authors state the goals of the so-called “special military operation,” which include the defense of the Donbas and Russia’s preventive security measures. They also write about how the “special military operation” has united Russians, and that Russia is a hero state (a reference to the “defense” of Donbas). In addition, an entire paragraph is devoted to hostile disinformation on the “special military operation” and inoagents (in the familiar formula of “enemies of the people”).
Putin’s decree (May 2024) approving the “Fundamentals of State Policy on Historical Education” can be considered a kind of summary of the process of nationalization (monopolization) of history. The document mentions that “Russia is a great state with a long history, a civilization-state that has united Russians and many other peoples of Eurasia into a single cultural-historical community.” The use of this term gives grounds to conclude that the Russian government is making efforts on the Soviet model (the Soviet nation) to shape a new historical community. Moreover, there is talk of a global crisis of national identity based on the destruction of historical memory and the rehabilitation and resurrection of neo-colonialism, neo-imperialism and neo-Nazism. Thus, it is necessary to oppose the actions of foreign states in denying or downplaying Russia’s historical contribution to the development of world civilization, attempts to distort historical memory and distort historical truth, negatively assess events and periods of Russian history and spread false perceptions about Russia, as well as the use by the collective West of falsification of history as a weapon in the information war aimed at destroying the integrity of Russian society and the state.
Conclusions
Putin’s “love” for history is a deeply mercurial approach by a dictator making efforts to appropriate/state history in order to make it a tool for legitimizing totalitarian power, consolidating the empire-state and territorial expansion. The move away from the interpretive model toward mythicizing and falsifying history is used by the authorities to maintain the frozen state of Russian national memory in the context of the crimes committed by Tsarist, Bolshevik and Putinist Russia. In contrast, the cult of the past and heroes helps sustain the collectivist-authoritarian identity of Russians who love strong-arm rule.
Walent Baluk
Department of International Security
Institute of International Relations UMCS
