By EUvsDisinfo

The manipulation of the information environment and interference by foreign actors has become more prevalent than ever. New technologies are being abused to manipulate the information environment, often targeting directly the EU or its individual Member States. It is used as a broader strategy to malignly interfere in and destabilize the democratic systems across the world, combining different instruments (e.g. cyber-attacks,information manipulation, censorship etc.). The Strategic Compass for Security and Defence has identified foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) as one of the pressing foreign policy and security issues of the EU, closely connected to the challenges to the field of cybersecurity and hybrid threats.

In 2023, the EEAS put in place tangible measures and structures to allow to systematically detect and expose FIMI, including disinformation. The EU FIMI Toolbox was further developed through the establishment of the FIMI Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (FIMI-ISAC), which is a significant step towards building a community based approach and a genuine network of FIMI defenders with the civil society and other stakeholders.

Through the work of its geographical task forces, the EEAS continued to denounce Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and reinforced the EU’s messages of support to Ukraine and provided evidence for additional sanctioning of Russian instruments of FIMI and war propaganda. The team continued to raise public awareness about the Kremlin’s information manipulation and interference activities around the globe. The EUvsDisinfo project reached more than 20 million people in 2023. Efforts have been extended to reach out to the African continent as well. For that, a dedicated Sub-Saharan Africa StratCom Task Force was created within the EEAS StratCom Directorate.

In addition to better understanding the problem and raising awareness around it, a big part of the efforts of the EEAS have been to contribute to building resilience in partner countries, cooperating both with governments and the civil society, who play a central role in tackling the FIMI threat. The team has been working with partners like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and many more. A wide range of strategic communication actions and engagements with the key local stakeholders, including journalists,fact-checkers, broader civil society actors but also government structures across the Eastern Partnership,Western Balkans and the MENA region have been implemented. More so, capabilities to tackle China’s FIMI activities were further developed.

Importantly, the EEAS has intensified cooperation with other EU Institutions and bodies via such existing formats as the internal Network against Disinformation (NaD) or the European Cooperation Network on Elections (ECNE). Close cooperation with the European Parliament, in particular via the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE) continued before it came to the end of its mandate. Exchanges with EU Member States,like-minded international partners, civil society and private industry accelerated in particular in the context of2024, the year of elections.

Read the full report here.

FOR MORE INFORMATION:

The 1st Report on FIMI threats

The report on FIMI targeting LGBTIQ+ people

The 2nd Report on FIMI threats

2022 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter FIMI

By EUvsDisinfo